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FADING EUPHORIA AT THE DUTCH-GERMAN BORDER? THE CASE OF AVANTIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article deals with the failure of the AVANTIS cross-border business estate. The inception of 
this hitherto largely undeveloped site took place in the early 1990s, a period which we suggest 
characterizing with the notion of EUphoria, i.e. a widely held belief in the future of a borderless 
Europe. EUphoria is seen as the key to bringing together otherwise separate discourses under 
one shared ambition of constructing a cross-border business estate. With the fading of 
EUphoria, however, AVANTIS resurfaces as a shared problem and appears to have been built 
on expectations and promises held within a discourse of European integration rather than 
among private investors. In retrospect, AVANTIS as a product of EUphoria remains a EUtopia, 
albeit with very few believers. 
 
Key words: EUphoria, EUtopia, South Limburg, cross-border cooperation, Borderless Europe, 
discourse analysis 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Right on top of a southern stretch of the Dutch-German border, a 100 ha. business estate pops 
into view which, seen from the air, is shaped like a giant key, a key towards a borderless 
Europe. What can also be seen from the air is that most of these 100 ha. are still greenfields 
rather than office buildings. As of yet, AVANTIS has not become the European Business and 
Science Park that public officials had in mind during its inception in the 1990s but, rather, 
remains a park for walking the dog – one of the most expensive parks to do so, however. What 
went wrong?  
 
There are several conventional explanations which apply to the failure of this project: time 
catching up with plans, differing interests of the stakeholders, and events thwarting 
implementation, to name but a few. These explanations are paramount in the self-interpretation 
of the parties involved, but are rather fragmented. Alternatively, the explanation presented in 
this article is ‘EUphoria’1: a temporary condition that produced a favorable climate for cross-
border policymaking and development in the context of European integration. In what follows, 
we will reconstruct the history of AVANTIS from the perspective of EUphoria and unmask the 
project’s EUtopian dimensions that had been there from the beginning. 
 
Our reconstruction and findings are based on a case study covering a series of policy 
documents and consultancy reports of government agencies (referred to in the article) in the 
Heerlen-Aachen cross-border area, and supplemented by a series of 18 interviews with public 
officials of both German and Dutch affiliation. The approach that underlies this case study is a 
discourse analysis following Jensen and Richardson (2004, pp. 44-66), which is focused on 
identifying policy discourses as consisting of linguistic as well as socio-spatial or material 
dimensions and thus embodying a conceptualization of discourse as more than linguistic. For an 
analysis of spatial planning and development, this is important because each discourse ‘frames’ 
or constructs space in a specific way and according to specific logics, which may be potentially 
at odds with alternative understandings of space, where space itself plays a crucial role in 
enabling and restraining a policy discourse. The framing of space may pertain to the way a 
region is understood from its past events, the way its present problems are framed or ignored, 
as well as to the way a region should develop in the future (cf. Kooij et al. 2012). As this case 
study focuses largely on the emergence of a discourse on cross-border regional development 
(also see Jacobs 2012) and investments of public money towards and in legitimization of that 
end, we adopt this discourse-analytical approach to uncover the way in which the discourse 
gained influence, persuasion, and became taken-for-granted (cf. Jensen and Richardson 2004, 
p. 56). 
 
Even though in this text we focus mostly on the specific history of the AVANTIS cross-border 
business estate and try to explain its peculiar unsuccessfulness, the use of the lens of discourse 
analysis inevitably brings us to consider the relevance of the wider context of cross-border 
cooperation as part of European integration (cf. Scott 2000; Perkmann 2007). The European 
integration discourse, which is related to the construction of EU regional policy, off and on 
seems to frame regional processes of cross-border cooperation. Again, we stress the 
importance of a discourse-analytical approach that takes material and social-spatial dimensions 
into account, for the European integration discourse is fuelled by the structural funds – a 
material dimension – and this undeniably plays a role in cross-border cooperation projects. We 
therefore highlight the emergence of cross-border regions and the funding schemes for cross-
border cooperation in order to understand the implications of EUphoria. 
EUPHORIA 
 
The story of AVANTIS goes back to the early 1990s, a time which we will characterize by using 
the notion of EUphoria, the commonly felt expectation of intensified European integration after 
such major events as the fall of the Berlin Wall and a series of treaties signed to foster cross-
border cooperation and overcome the internal borders within the territory of the European 
Community’s member states. Obviously, EUphoria is not the only explanation for the failure of 
AVANTIS – consider, for example, environmental issues, changes in the economic situation, 
and delays in construction – but we think that the concept of EUphoria offers a more substantial 
explanation, and makes our analysis relevant to the wider context of cross-border cooperation. 
 
EUphoria characterizes the Zeitgeist of a shared optimism towards a borderless Europe, 
spurring the emergence of cross-border cooperation projects that would today be seen as 
overambitious. Indeed, whereas much cross-border cooperation today has a more incidental, 
pragmatic, and deliberative character, the 1990s saw a host of proposals for physical 
intervention in the borderlands, that is, strategic visions or development plans (Jacobs & Varró 
2011). What presently goes under the name of AVANTIS is one such proposal that was actually 
realized on the Dutch-German border between the Dutch city of Heerlen and the German city of 
Aachen. 
 
From the perspective of cross-border cooperation, one point in history cannot be 
overemphasized, namely the demise of the Iron Curtain in 1989. With all its symbolic value, the 
demise of the Iron Curtain and, most obviously, the fall of the Berlin Wall, produced a general 
optimism towards the disappearance of (European) borders (Christiansen & Jørgensen 2000; 
Wilson & Donnan 1998). As indicated earlier, the expectation was commonly felt that the 
European Community would continue expansion and, above all, integration. At the end of the 
Cold War this was also the time when the ongoing construction of the European Union was 
globally viewed as an innovative model for peaceful integration of the economic and political 
systems, indeed as a novel civilian power (Nicolaïdis & Howse 2002; Rifkin 2004). 
 
Treaties and new policy arrangements played a strong role in the EUphoria of the 1990s. The 
Schengen Treaty, which was originally signed in 1985 between a small number of countries, 
following the events of 1989, was successively upgraded in 1993 to become a near to EU-wide 
agreement shaping the internal market. The introduction of European funding for cross-border 
cooperation (INTERREG) in 1990 came at a perfect moment because of the general optimism 
concerning the EU and the disappearance of borders – what we have named EUphoria. This 
funding scheme quickly became the catalyst for cross-border cooperation projects (Perkmann 
2003, p. 166). AVANTIS was not the only project that so explicitly focused on the border. For 
example, the twin towns of Kerkrade (the Netherlands) and Herzogenrath (Germany), at a 
stone’s throw away from AVANTIS, teamed up to form the European town of ‘Eurode’, 
epitomized by the symbolic removal in 1993 of the stone barrier in the middle of the 
Nieuwstraat/Neustrasse (for a critical analysis, see e.g. Ehlers 2001), and underscored by the 
construction of the Eurode Business Center, built on top of the Dutch-German border. With only 
one building, arguably, it is a miniature version of AVANTIS. 
 
INTERREG and the emergence and shaping of EU regional policy produced a discourse that 
laid claim to space in the borderlands, the first step being the partition of the European territory 
into a series of regions, including cross-border regions (cf. Perkmann 1999). Some of these 
cross-border regions, such as the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine which covers our case, existed prior 
to this process (Knippenberg 2004) as a result of bottom-up developments. There was no EU 
financing and cross-border regions basically functioned as (informal) networks of cross-border 
cooperation, focusing mostly on practical problem-solving (cf. Perkmann 2003; Perkmann 
1999). With the advent of support schemes in the context of EU regional policy, cross-border 
cooperation began to incorporate parts of that discourse on European integration that was 
connected to EU funding. With the conversion of the existing cross-border regions into 
Euroregions, that is, EU institutions dealing with the implementation of regional policy, a 
discourse of territorial rescaling emerged (e.g. Brenner 1999; Jessop 2003), touching base with 
the EUphoric beliefs of the eventual disappearance of the border in policy circles. On the 
ground, we witnessed the emergence of cross-border regional development schemes2 meant to 
guide the attribution of the regional funds, and spurred ‘experiment’-like development projects, 
like AVANTIS. We argue that these developments indicate a certain belief in the ‘euregional’ 
becoming a functional and political territorial scale (cf. Jacobs & Varró 2011). Subsequent 
experiences with EU funding indicate a degree of over-enthusiasm but we will first describe the 
developments taking place during that initial stage of Europeanization of cross-border regions 
and cross-border cooperation with regard to the case of AVANTIS. 
TRIAL AREA IN BORDERLESS EUROPE OR EUTOPIA? 
 
The fertile grounds for AVANTIS were created during Martin Bangemann’s time in office. As the 
EU commissioner for Internal market and Industrial affairs from 1989 to 1995, and for Industrial 
affairs, Information & Telecommunications Technologies from 1995 to 1999, he initiated an 
experiment to explore the obstacles and advantages of a cross-border business and service 
facility. The EU held a competition and invited six research institutes, both German and Dutch 
affiliated, to investigate the possibilities and obstacles. The aim was to anticipate concrete 
situations; for example, imagine an office on the border and the refrigerator starts dripping and 
the liquid runs from the Dutch side towards the German side. Which insurance company would 
have to pay for the damage? Thus, the idea was to set up a trial area, in which such affairs 
could be tested and, subsequently, the outcomes could be transferred to other cases in Europe. 
This project was confidential, and seems to have been carried out during the first period of 
commissioner Bangemann. 
 
The actual idea of a cross-border business estate originated at the beginning of the 1990s, 
which resulted in a declaration of intent between the Cities of Heerlen and Aachen (Gemeente 
Heerlen & Stadt Aachen 1992). The declaration of intent displayed a high level of detail 
concerning the size and location of the business estate. In addition, bilateral working groups 
were proposed to sort out the details of cross-border development in the fields of spatial 
planning, environment, economic affairs and real estate. The idea was to provide space for 
companies of regional and international significance, which use scientific services of the 
academy in Heerlen and the polytechnical academy RWTH (Rheinisch-Westfälische 
Technische Hochschule) in Aachen, and of “high tech” research institutes. Transport companies 
were explicitly ruled out (Gemeente Heerlen & Stadt Aachen 1992). 
 
The financing of the cross-border business estate was supposed to be contributed largely 
through subsidies, in particular, European subsidies, such as INTERREG and EFRO. Also 
national financing like the Dutch programme for business environment urban junctions 
(bedrijfsomgeving stedelijke knooppunten), allocated 17 million guilders from 1992 to 1995 
(Groene 2000). 
 
Moreover, the idea was to create what was called an ‘à la carte model’(‘Zapfkrahnmodel’ in 
German, ‘tapkraanmodel’ in Dutch), where companies located anywhere on the business estate 
could ‘pick and mix’ their laws in a way that would suit them best. For example, it would be 
possible for an entrepreneur to start a company, paying German taxes, but using public utilities 
from the Netherlands. This required enormous governmental efforts, resulting in a number of 
bilateral agreements between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, such as 
the third supplementary protocol concerning double taxation (Federal Republic of Germany & 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands 2004). 
 
AVANTIS was an ambitious project that aspired overcoming and even exploiting the border 
location by attracting high-tech firms looking to serve two markets. As we now look back on that 
time and see the ambitions of the project shattered, we can hardly avoid another apt wordplay, 
namely EUtopia3. Obviously, it was known that cross-border developments would be complex, 
time-consuming or, perhaps, impossible but the early 1990s offered the right climate to take on 
the challenge under the legitimate label of a trial area. The developments at the European level 
seemed favorable and regional officials presented themselves as forerunners of a type of 
cooperation project that was considered to become normal in a further decade or two (cf. 
Christiansen & Jørgensen 2000; Wilson & Donnan 1998). 
CAMPUS EUROPA: THE VIRTUAL LABORATORY OF INTEGRATION 
 
Completely in line with their symbolic investment in AVANTIS, the parties involved tried to rub 
out the institutional differences between the two countries. Several working groups, both 
national and bi-national were initiated to coordinate between law and legislation of the two 
countries and the different procedures that existed on either side of the border. As a result, the 
zoning plan was developed according to both the German and Dutch standards, in two 
languages. The zoning plan was approved by the authorities in 1997 (Stadt Aachen et al. 1997). 
Additional studies also needed to be carried out such as the environmental impact assessment 
for both the German and Dutch sides, the ‘Umwelverträglichkeitsstudien’, the economic cost 
benefit study and market research. 
 
Despite approval of the zoning plan, the different legal systems still made it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to request a building permit on the border. Therefore, a further exploration of the 
legal systems and its procedures was called for. Central to this exploration was the combined 
request for building permits, aptly called Campus Europa (CAWA n.d.). This was done in the 
case study of a virtual building on the border, in the framework of an INTERREG IIIA project 
from 2003 until 2005. A single permit procedure was impossible, due to the fact that the 
Netherlands had three separate procedures at that time (Bouwaanvraag, Milieuvergunning, 
Gebruiksvergunning), whereas Germany had only one (Bauantrag). Thus, a combined 
procedure was developed by bureaucrats and officials of the Stadt Aachen, Gemeente Heerlen, 
Provincie Limburg, Nordrhein Westfalen, Ministerie van Economische Zaken, INTERREG, 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse zaken, and the EU.  This case, and the case of Solland Solar, a 
company that wanted to build their facility on both sides of the border, were processed and used 
for a further orchestration of the procedures (CAWA n.d.). 
 
With all the right legal conditions in place or otherwise sorted out, there seemed to be no reason 
for downgrading the ambition level. In other words, the master plan would signify a borderless 
business estate, that is, with eradicated institutional borders and no visible border on the 
premises. It was developed as one site which meant, for example, that the German side of the 
park could only be reached over Dutch territory, that specific spot being the entrance of the 
estate. From the sky, the urban plan looked like a key, symbolizing a borderless and unified 
Europe. The urban development plan, furthermore, provided large parcels in a green setting on 
the border, inspired by visits that the shareholders made to Stockley Park near London. This 
would create the most attractive environment for large multinational businesses in the broader 
‘high-tech’ sector. Finally, and importantly, the zoning plan managed to include a new railway 
connection between Heerlen and Aachen, with a regional coverage to facilitate environmentally-
friendly commuting. 
 
In sum, the whole planning process started in 1992/1993 and lasted until 1997, when the zoning 
plan was approved and all other studies were finished. In 1998, the public limited company GOB 
(grensoverschreidend bedrijventerrein Heerlen/Aachen) was established, with the Municipality 
of Heerlen, the City of Aachen, LIOF (Limburgse Ontwikkelings- en Investeringsmaatschappij, 
Limburg Development and Investment Company) and LEG Stadtentwicklung (LEG stands for 
Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft, Spatial Development Company) as shareholders. In 1999, the 
name was changed into AVANTIS, European Business and Science Park. 
THE PERSISTENT BORDER 
 
In 2013, only a fraction of the available parcels is occupied by firms, causing great financial 
losses at AVANTIS N.V. (a public limited company, plc). In the self-interpretation of the 
shareholders, there are several causes for the failure of AVANTIS but these, in our view, 
obscure the fact that the border marks essential difference that cannot be rubbed out by efforts 
on the local scale. We will review the most common explanations before returning to the issue 
of EUphoria and argue for a more fundamental reason underlying the failure of AVANTIS. 
 
First of all, during the environmental impact assessment, three abandoned hamster holes 
(Cricetus cricetus) were found. The Badger & Tree Foundation, which was specialized in legal 
disputes concerning nature protection, together with a local organization, challenged AVANTIS 
N.V. 23 times before the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) (Vonk 2001; Beunen et al. 
2013, p. 283). Legal proceedings were successfully finished in 2003 but, according to the 
shareholders, the market for business parcels had dramatically declined by then. A few 
companies were interested in parcels but, on account of the legal proceedings, they renounced 
their interest. Changes in the market implied a virtual end to the demand for these large and 
top-end parcels.  
 
Secondly, instead of the expected convergence of laws and procedures, some laws and 
procedures in fact diverged, such as the one on energy. For example, companies on AVANTIS 
at the German side are unable to obtain electricity, because the estate has a Dutch electricity 
connection. In addition, telecommunication was simultaneously German and Dutch on 
AVANTIS, but the OPTA (the Dutch Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority) ruled 
in 2003 that this was against Dutch law. And there are more problems, such as signposting and 
mail delivery (Commissie Hermans 2007). In this respect, the à la carte model seems 
impossible, and will remain impossible in the near future, let alone the idea of a borderless 
business estate. And to the extent that there are some advantages to be gained, this proved to 
be possible exclusively on parcels that were located exactly on the border, leaving most part of 
the business estate without such advantages. 
 
Finally, the combined zoning plan of 1997 could not be used any longer, due to national 
changes in legislation and procedures. So when it is even difficult to change a zoning plan in 
case of a purely domestic topography, changing a transnational zoning plan in order to 
accommodate changes in the market (in this case, an increased demand for smaller parcels) 
can be so time-consuming that, when done, market conditions might have changed again. 
 
To mitigate the situation of AVANTIS, the Dutch tried to incorporate it as one of the focal points 
of their spatial-economic policy. In several green and white papers on spatial-economic policy of 
the Province of Limburg, AVANTIS was identified as one of the key areas for the Limburg 
economy, as an operating base for the promising cluster of ‘new energy’, instead of the 
envisioned theme of the declaration of intent in 1992 (i.e. ‘automotiv’). Rather, an atmosphere of 
‘open innovation’ should be created on the ‘open campus AVANTIS’. In addition to ‘new energy’, 
AVANTIS was supposed to be the location for the cross-border European Cardiovascular 
Center, a joint initiative of Maastricht UMC+ (Universitair Medisch Centrum) and Klinikum 
Aachen (Taskforce Versnellingsagenda 2005; Raad van advies Versnellingsagenda 2008; 
Commissie Hermans 2007). 
 
Whereas in the Netherlands, AVANTIS figured as a node in a discursive policy world of clusters, 
campuses and the knowledge economy, focused on improving Limburg’s economy, in Germany 
AVANTIS was not considered as key to their economic structure (see Kooij et al. 2012 for an 
analysis of the Dutch campus discourse). It is true that in the beginning of the 1990s, Aachen 
had a lack of space for businesses, and the development of the cross-border business estate 
was seen as a good solution but, for the city of Aachen, it was never part of a grand scheme to 
attract innovative and high-tech businesses to improve the local economy. What’s more, at the 
beginning of the 2000s when the hamster issue was still unresolved, the RWTH Aachen 
decided to develop two campuses of its own for its technological spin-offs and institutes. 
Campus Melaten and Campus West were planned to foster space for education, research, spin-
offs and businesses. These plans made it even more unlikely that spin-offs would move to 
AVANTIS. 
 
The economic downturn and the perception that not all cross-border issues were resolved 
created a standstill in the issue of parcels. Due to this standstill, AVANTIS N.V. needed re-
financing of 26 million euros in 2006, of 5 million euros in 2009, and another 26 million euros in 
2012 (Gemeente Heerlen 2011a; Gemeente Heerlen 2011b). These capital injections may save 
AVANTIS N.V. as an organization but cannot hide the divergence in national law and 
procedures, and will preserve the uncertainty for entrepreneurs looking for business locations 
on the cross-border business estate. 
FADING EUPHORIA 
 
It is clear that subsidies from the EU made the development of AVANTIS possible. Without it, 
and without the EUphoria of the 1990s AVANTIS would probably not have existed in its current 
form. However, what had been obscured by a temporary belief in diminishing European borders, 
is that borders persist and need to be taken seriously. EUphoria took attention away from the 
crucial differences between Germany and the Netherlands and switched it to the need and real 
possibility of overcoming the border. It was only when EUphoria began to fade that the 
persisting border differences resurfaced. EUphoria as a concept based in a discourse-analytical 
perspective (cf. Jensen & Richardson 2004), we argue, sheds new light on general 
disillusionment with cross-border cooperation in the context of European integration. Obviously, 
standard explanations that include cultural differences, differences in rules and regulations, or 
differences in interests continue to be valid but the main question here is how one was able to 
conceive of and implement a plan that challenges these differences. Let us reconsider the case 
of AVANTIS in the light of EUphoria. 
 
First, the concept of the cross-border business estate at a time of a belief in a borderless 
Europe functioned as a bridging concept between separate discourses, in this case cross-
border cooperation, German spatial policy, and Dutch spatial policy. It glossed over the fact that 
these discourses had different origins and were coupled to different political and legal contexts. 
When the resulting discourse (or ‘discursive configuration’, cf. Kooij et al. 2012) has sufficient 
means to carry on and sustain itself, for example through European funding, through the lack of 
controversies, through favorable economic conditions, it has a real impact in physical space. 
 
Second, when the situation sketched above is the case, there will be networks of public officials 
devoting relatively large parts of their time to participate in the cooperation discourse. With 
AVANTIS the stakeholders were in such a position. Among other things, joint visits to reference 
projects (e.g. Stockley Park in the UK) contributed to concretization of the common ambition. It 
was, so to speak, a train set in motion and almost impossible to stop. As a ‘micro’ discourse the 
participants in the project were able to develop a specific framing of borderland space (Jacobs & 
Varró 2011, pp. 14-15) that could be temporarily sustained through the condition of EUphoria 
that was generally present in the political system. 
 
Third, the master plan for AVANTIS was strongly dependent on expectations that were directly 
connected to EUphoria, which implies that it was not anchored in existing realities. We have 
mentioned three illustrations; 1) the key selling point of the à la carte model, where firms could 
pick the most favorable tax system, energy supply, etc. (either Dutch or German), 2) the 
attractive park environment modeled after Stockley Park, and 3) the new regional railway line 
making AVANTIS easily accessible. None of these three points have proved to be realizable: 
most firms would not invest on the basis of promises but rather, on the basis of guaranteed 
assets. Only with EUphoria, a separate policy discourse was able to emerge which took such 
points as almost already real, namely with reference to the ongoing process of European 
integration. 
 
In line with a number of authors (e.g. Knippenberg 2004; Knippschild 2011; Perkmann 2007; 
Popescu 2011) we also find evidence of a general disillusionment of cross-border cooperation 
within the INTERREG framework, that is, cross-border regions have not become new 
governance levels comparable to states or sub-state provinces, regions, counties etc. What we 
add to this diagnosis, however, is that the policy discourse of European integration, which 
includes circuits of money such as INTERREG funding, does impact upon local cooperation 
processes in the sense that it encourages public officials to be more progressive (i.e. more 
ambitious from a cross-border spatial development perspective) than would be advisable from 
the point of view of what is legally, politically, and economically possible. The degree to which 
this is the case seems to have decreased (i.e. the fading of EUphoria), but we argue that the 
case of AVANTIS is a good illustration of the general argument. 
 
Not only the stakeholders of AVANTIS are forced to reconsider strategies but also in the wider 
context of EU funded cross-border cooperation, critical self-reflection can be observed. Borders 
have proven to be more persistent than expected (hoped for) and subsidies do not convincingly 
lead to actual integration across borders. With the discussion on how or if the INTERREG 
funding scheme should be continued after 2013 looming in the background, Euroregions and 
their constituents reconsider the options. One possibility is the adoption of a European Grouping 
of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), a legal instrument which provides collaborating local or 
regional governments with a framework to formalize their cooperation. However, in the 
transboundary area of Heerlen-Aachen, this has led to an impasse because the benefits are not 
clear enough as long as one cannot agree on what tasks to endow EGTC with. The symbolic 
meaning of EGTC as the future of cooperation in transboundary regions is not readily accepted 
but, rather, its real possibilities are thoroughly evaluated before anything happens; a reality 
which underscores the absence of EUphoria. In the meantime, reconsidering ways in which to 
attribute INTERREG funds, there appears to be a move towards privileging larger projects over 
smaller ones, with the argument of greater impact and visibility. The case of AVANTIS, 
however, may serve as a critical question mark to such a strategy. 
 
As a final note, we would like to point to the inherent logics of the discourse on cross-border 
cooperation. One could see it as a relic of the 1990s’ EUphoria but also accept the underlying 
paradox, namely that one requires a border to do cross-border cooperation. And the discursive 
logic is that funding of cross-border cooperation, on the condition that it is done in an effective 
way, leads to integration/cohesion. But, taking into account the underlying paradox, what such 
funding actually does is the reproduction of a border. 
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Notes 
 
1. The similar notion of ‘europhoria’ has been coined earlier (Hospers and Groenendijk in Prinz 
et al., 2003) to refer to initial enthusiasm accompanying the introduction of the new European 
currency EURO, which was the successor of the virtual ECU. 
2. In the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine, this was the MHAL (Maastricht/Heerlen, Hasselt, Aachen, 
Liège) Spatial Development Concept of 1994 (Peters, 1994). 
3. The concept of EUtopia has been coined before (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002) but, there, 
refers to the idea of Europe as a civilian power which inspires thinkers and politicians globally. 
In that sense, it bears more comparison with the idea of the American Dream (cf. Rifkin, 2004). 
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